Buna-n safety reliefs...

New Inspection report:June 2, 2011
SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION -
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION
REPORT 0500027 I 1201 1 008

Based on the samples selected for review, the inspection team concluded that Entergy was

"generally effective"

in identifying, evaluating and resolving problems

....It is like they gave VY a C- school grade....

The VY relief threads were part of the NRC OIG secret investion on part 21 non reporting...

So yesterday I was notified, surprise, they turned down my 2.206 concerning the Buna-n thread seals. They accepted the other petitioner on this, i thought the NRC was a sure lay over this.

The timeline in answering me had been delayed, I was wondering why this was so. If they would have accepted my petition, there would be nothing for me to say until the petition came back and I suspect it would have been months. I think this was delayed for a purpose...

So yesterday I was bummed. I kinda was thinking of not taking them up on it.

So the new inspection report popped up a day later....today. My interpretation is they were announcing to me by the rejection that something new was going to pop up. They knew once I'd seen this inspection report...I'd know they had answered my questions. After that, I would have to have another swing at petition board. They knew Entergy and the nuclear industry would catch and feel my knee jerk reaction.

Basically the NRC knew by rejecting my sure lay SRV thread 2.206, they knew that was the quickest way to get me back on the transcripted record and me communicating with everyone....

So today after reading the new inspection report I requested another shot at the petition board and they came quickly back with, they will hear me on June 15 weds from 10am to 11am...

I suspect the NRC and Entergy knew the inspection report was released today, the NRC would then surprisingly make a request to Entergy to schedule my thread second shot with hours of the inspection release. Jesus Christ, the NRC rejects mike's 2.206 yesterday (the other petitioner got laid), the inspection report gets released the next day, and within hours mike mulligan wants to again schedule time to babble about the inspection report results. I wonder if Entergy got the notification of my rejection yesterday by e-mail?

Get it, Entergy and the industry could see this dance with me and the NRC. Do you see how fishy this is?

Do you get it, the NRC directly rejected my petition, but they exactly answered all my questions on the first petition in the inspection results.

Jesus Christ, the life of a man is frustrating, all she wants to do is make-out, but she wouldn't let me get inside her pants...

They know my fuel is frustration...if they lay me i won't have any more interest with them...

Some times I think the NRC people are all idiots, but at other times I think they are operating at levels much higher than me?

These smart college pricks :).

And I was talking buna-n problems yesterday...

Oops:

http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-v...

LER 0500027112010-002-00&01: Inoperability of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (SRV) Due to Degraded Thread Seals. During the 2010 RFO, the pneumatic actuators for the four SRVs were tested and leakage was identified through the shaft-to-piston thread seal that was in excess of the design requirement on two of the four SRVs. The inspectors determined that the licensee's evaluation did not specifically identify two apparent causes or significant contributing causes. The SRV vendor did not submit a part 21 report for the SRV issue due to the Type 2 actuator being used in an application outside of two design parameters. The design deficiencies were:

So that means the LER was falsified...

Anyways, why didn't the NRC perceive this was a area of safety and immediately write a inspection report right after the outage...

Why didn't the agency see they were using inferior replacement parts and prevent them from reinstalling them untill the correct ones came in?

. Design ambient temperature for the Type 2 actuator is 150 degrees F according to the vendor design documents. The actuators at VY are exposed to an ambient temperature environment up to 185-190 degrees F according to the CR. This would result in a 35-40 degree F loss of margin for the BUNA N thread sealant (rated at 210-250 degrees F.)

I remember them in the drywell and accident condition can go up 260 degrees?

". The Type 2 actuator has cooling slots, where as the Type 1 actuator does not. These cooling slots were not accounted for when the Type 1 actuator was replaced with the Type 2 actuator and the cooling slots were covered by insulation. This caused the designed convection cooling of the actuator internals to be lost. As a result, the BUNA-N thread seal material was exposed to high temperature for a longer period, which increased the potential for degradation of the BUNA-N thread
seals.

"This operability determination was reviewed by the inspectors and provides a reasonable basis for continued operability until the Fall2011 RFO, due to sufficient margin being available in the safety-related nitrogen back up supply for the pneumatic actuation system to overcome worst case leakage for all design cases."

Think if this was the principle they used with the replacement of all broken safety parts, replace them with poorer quality and then the NRC accepts it. Can you image the potential of component breakdowns in a accident with a principles like this.

Like, what are the actual testing of the type 2 component that gets you to this justification...where is the science on this besides guessing...

So how about rubber melting, what does the rubber melt at...how about that clogging up the valve...

You wana go down the biggest black hole/rat hole imaginable ask them to define: reasonable basis?

"Since the previously unidentified ACs/CCs would not result in current operability being drawn into question and CAs are in place which would also address these causes, the issue is considered to be a minor violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVl, "Corrective Action."

So they can play around getting to AC/CC that gives them permission to falsify late LERs.

"Although not developed specifically for these
apparent causes or contributing causes (ACslCCs), the CAs will address these design issues.

Holly smokes, their root cause program is up side down...

"Report00000271/2011002 documents an LER closeout review and two Licensee ldentified Violations related to the discovery of the SRV issue."

I don't think the punishment is enough to make them never do it again...

"NRC Inspection Report 0500027112011002 documents an LER closeout review and two Licensee identified Violations related to inoperability of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) due to degraded thread seals. During the 2010 RFO: the pneumatic actuators for the four SRVs were tested and leakage was identified through the shaft-to piston thread seal that was in excess of the design requirement on two of the four SRVs. Material testing determined that the apparent cause of the degraded thread seal condition was thermal degradation. During RFO27, Entergy discovered that the SRV Vendor no longer supported the Type-1 SRV actuators which VY had. The vendor recommended replacing the Type 1 actuators with a Type 2 actuator. The Type 1 actuator has silicone thread sealants which are rated up to -390 degrees F while a Type 2 actuator uses BUNA-N polymer which is rated up to 210-250 degrees F. Entergy Engineering staff overly relied upon the vendor's recommendations and did not conduct an appropriate equivalency review on their own. Thus when the Type 2 actuator was used at VY, the valve was exposed to higher temperatures which resulted in thermal degradation and air leakage from the actuator."

During RFO27, Entergy discovered that the SRV Vendor no longer supported the Type-1 SRV actuators which VY had.

So entergy didn't have these repair parts on board the site...they had to cold order them...

Oh yea, this guy lied to the state for entergy , I trust him with a big employee concern...

You might as well come to me with a concern...I'll fix it!

D. McElwee, Employee Concerns Representative.

June 2, 2011
Mr. MichaelColomb

SUBJECT: VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION -
NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION

REPORT 05000271/2011002
Dear Mr. Colomb:
On April 21, 2011, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station...

Material testing determined that the apparent cause of the degraded thread seal condition was thermal degradation. The thread seals were replaced and tested on all our SRVs prior to startup from the 2010 refueling outage.

Entergy determined that this potentially affected the ability of the SRVs to perform their manual and automatic depressurization function, as required by Technical Specifications, since the leakage impacted the ability of the SRVs to satisfy design actuation requirements. Entergy determined that there was firm evidence that this condition may have existed for a period of time greater than allowed by Technical Specifications, and therefore this event was reportable.

Due to the availability of a safety-class back-up nitrogen supply with separate pressure regulators, Entergy determined that adequate capacity for the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)existed at all times. Due to the redundancy in ADS design, the availability of the HPCI system, and the availability of a safety-class backup nitrogen supply, the ability to depressurize the reactor was maintained, and there was no potential adverse impact to public health and safety.

The inspectors reviewed the subject LER, the as-found condition during the refueling outage, the subsequent material testing and analysis, and Entergy's evaluation of thecondition. A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
Licensee. The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 4OA7. This
LER is closed.

http://www.topix.com/forum/city/brattleboro-v...

LER 2010 -- 002 -- 00

Event date: 10 25 2010

Submit date: 12 22 2010

LER-2010-02-01

Event date: 10 25 2010 2010 -- 002 --

resubmit date 01 03 01 2011